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This paper investigated the impact of leadership style on the stability of small social dilemma groups. In two experiments, group
members were more likely to exit their group and take their resources elsewhere if they were supervised by an autocratic style leader
than by a democratic or laissez-faire style leader. The destabilizing influence of autocratic leadership is due to the procedural rather
than distributive aspects of this leadership style: More members exited their group under an autocratic style leader, relative to a
democratic style leader, regardless of whether or not they received favorable personal outcomes from the leader. Hence, autocratic
leadership is not a stable long-term solution to the problem of public goods in groups.
 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Introduction
The welfare of groups in society depends to a con-
siderable extent on the quality of the goods generated
collectively by group members. Although each member
probably acknowledges the importance of goods that
benefit everyone in the group, it can be difficult to
maintain such goods at the highest levels, because every
member in principle profits equally from their existence,
regardless of whether they made a personal contribu-
tion. Hence, group members may be tempted to free-ride
on the investments of others in the group. In the social
psychological literature, such situations are generally
referred to as social dilemmas, or more specifically, as
public good dilemmas (Dawes, 1980; Messick & Brewer,
1983; Olson, 1965; Stroebe & Frey, 1982; Van Lange,
Liebrand, Messick, & Wilke, 1992; Van Vugt, Snyder,
Tyler, & Biel, 2000).
There are essentially two kinds of public good di-
lemmas (Komorita & Parks, 1994). In continuous public
goods, the quality of the generated good is linearly de-
pendent upon the number of people that invest in the
group. Examples include donating to a charity or con-
tributing to a social movement. In contrast, a discrete or
step-level public good requires a minimum number of* Corresponding author. Fax: +44-23-80594597.
E-mail address: mvv@soton.ac.uk (M. Van Vugt).
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doi:10.1016/S0022-1031(03)00061-1investors or amount of investment in the group. Sharing
the rent of a house, running a sports team, or setting up
a Neighborhood Crime Watch scheme are a few exam-
ples of such goods.
To provide and maintain a public good, group
members can decide among themselves to make volun-
tary contributions whenever they are required. But in
the long run, a better strategy may be structural change
within the group, designed to enforce a regular contri-
bution from each group member (Messick & Brewer,
1983; Olson, 1965; Yamagishi, 1986). A common type of
structural change, particularly within small groups, is
the appointment of a group leader (Van Vugt & De
Cremer, 1999, 2002).
Past work has contributed much to our understand-
ing about the conditions under which group members
are willing to give up their decisional freedom to a leader
to solve a social dilemma in their group (Foddy &
Crettenden, 1994; Messick et al., 1983; Rutte & Wilke,
1984, 1985; Samuelson, 1991; Samuelson & Messick,
1986, 1995; Samuelson, Messick, Rutte, & Wilke, 1984;
Wilke, 1991). But there are still some important gaps in
that understanding.
First, researchers have focused almost exclusively on
one type of leadership, namely an autocratic style (Mes-
sick & Brewer, 1983). This has led some analysts to
conclude that the only viable solution to social dilemma
conflicts is the adoption of a coercive, non-democraticerved.
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opher Hobbes (1651/1939) asserted that only a strong
central authority or leader figure can save society from
the ruthless competition of selfish individuals. This is
echoed in the work of many contemporary writers who
claim that social dilemma tragedies can only be prevented
if groups are willing to implement dictatorial solutions
(Arrow, 1951; Hardin, 1968; Messick & Brewer, 1983).
Second, researchers have not been very interested in
the consequences for the group of having a leader. There
seems to be an assumption that autocratic leadership
effectively resolves social dilemmas by forcing members
to invest in their group. Although this is true in situa-
tions where escape from a group is impossible, in many
situations group members not only have a choice be-
tween investing or not investing in a group, but also
between staying in the group or leaving, thereby affect-
ing the groups welfare and stability (cf. Ziller, 1965).
Stay/exit decisions may have important consequences
for a groups ability to provide public goods, particu-
larly step-level goods, because they require a minimum
number of members to contribute. Hence, effective
leaders must not only be able to solve the free-rider
problem in their groups, but also to keep a sufficient
number of members committed to those groups, thereby
preventing them from taking their resources elsewhere.
This paper extends previous research on leadership in
social dilemmas by investigating the consequences of
autocratic leadership in public good dilemmas within
open group settings—settings where people can move out
of groups if they wish. We are particularly interested in
the effects of autocratic versus democratic leadership
styles on the stay/exit decisions of group members.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, we believe that auto-
cratic leadership may not be an effective long-term solu-
tion to public good dilemmas, at least within open
groups, because autocratic leadership leads people to
reconsider their membership and leave the group, thereby
removing valuable resources from it. We also want to
investigate whether the predicted destabilizing influence
of autocratic leadership in groups is due to outcome
concerns among group members (lack of opportunity to
free-ride) or to concerns about the procedural aspects of
this leadership style (lack of procedural control).
Leadership in public good dilemmas
When group members want a leader to regulate the
provision of common goods, they must make decisions
about who to choose, whether the leader will be elected
or appointed, and (perhaps most importantly) how
much power the leader should have over the group
(Bass, 1990; French & Raven, 1959; Hollander, 1985;
Lewin, Lippit, & White, 1939; Van Vugt & De Cremer,
1999; White & Lippit, 1953; Yukl, 1989). The leadership
literature describes three broad power styles of leader-ship within groups, namely autocratic, democratic, and
laissez-faire (Bass, 1990; Lewin et al., 1939; Vroom &
Yetton, 1973; Yukl, 1989).
Applied to public good dilemmas, autocratic style
leaders will do whatever they feel is necessary to provide
the common good. They decide which group members
should contribute how much without asking anyone for
input. In contrast, democratic style leaders will involve
group members in the decision-making process. Demo-
cratic leadership can involve either participative (shared)
or consultative decision-making (Bass, 1990; Vroom &
Yetton, 1973). A participative leader makes decisions in
collaboration with group members, often using majority
rules or similar social decision schemes, whereas a con-
sultative leader makes decisions himself, after talking
with group members about their opinions. In this re-
search, we will concentrate on the democratic-consultative
leadership style. Finally, a laissez-faire style leader does
not have or seek control over group members, so they are
free to decide for themselves what to do. A laissez-faire
leader can, however, provide relevant information, such
as the step-level point or the performance of the group.
Research on social dilemmas has shown that group
members are generally unwilling to assign an autocratic
leader to deal with conflicts over the provision of public
goods or the preservation of public resources. For ex-
ample, Samuelson and Messick (1986) found that rather
than having a leader make all the decisions for them,
group members preferred to divide resources equally
among themselves to avert a resource crisis (see also
Samuelson, 1993). And Rutte and Wilke (1985) found
that when group members faced a collective resource
threat, they preferred to solve it through democratic
solutions, such as consensus or majority rules voting,
rather than through autocratic leadership.
Finally, Van Vugt and De Cremer (1999, Experiment
1) investigated group members preferences for different
styles of leadership in public good situations. After
group members repeatedly failed to provide the public
good through voluntary contributions, they had an
opportunity to choose a leader to improve their groups
performance. Among a range of leaders with different
styles, an autocratic leader was preferred the least,
whereas a democratic, consultative leader was preferred
the most. Taken altogether, these findings suggest that
group members regard autocratic solutions as less de-
sirable than democratic solutions for solving the prob-
lems associated with social dilemmas.
Group stability
Another reason why we believe that autocratic
leadership is not the best solution to public good di-
lemmas is that this type of leadership can threaten the
stability of a group. Group stability refers to the ability
of a group to operate as an intact system over an
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A primary source of instability in groups is member-
ship turnover (Ziller, 1965). Membership stability is
affected by two separate forces, the entry of new
members into the group and the exit of current group
members (Arrow & McGrath, 1995; Moreland & Le-
vine, 1982). Because the exit of a current member
(relative to the entry of a new member) is a more im-
mediate threat to group performance on tasks that
require a minimum number of contributors, we will
focus on the stay/exit decision in this research.
Stability in membership can benefit group perfor-
mance on many tasks (for a recent overview, see
Moreland, 1999). There are several advantages associ-
ated with group stability. First, group stability fosters
the commitment of individuals to their group. As a re-
sult, people are more willing to invest in the group
(Moreland & Levine, 1982). Second, it is easier to build
shared mental models (e.g., transactive memory) in
stable groups (Carley, 1991; Moreland, 1999). Third,
and most relevant to our research, membership stability
is critical when groups perform tasks that require a
minimum number of investors.
The exit problem has received little attention so far in
laboratory research on public good dilemmas. Tradi-
tionally, this research examines the question how co-
operation among group members emerges when they are
locked together in a social dilemma (for overviews, see
Komorita & Parks, 1994; Van Lange et al., 1992; Van
Vugt et al., 2000). In real life, however, group bound-
aries are often open and individuals can choose between
entering or not entering a group, and between staying in
or leaving a group (Ziller, 1965). For the provision and
management of public goods, an important issue is how
individuals (particularly those with a cooperative incli-
nation) can be encouraged to stay in a group when they
have the option to leave.1
To our knowledge, only two experiments have ex-
amined the exit strategy in small groups facing public
good dilemmas. Orbell, Schwartz-Sea, and Simmons
(1984) gave members of nine-person groups an exit
option after they had participated in a public good di-
lemma. Quite a few members chose this option (46%)
when the incentives to exit were high and group dis-
cussion was not allowed. Yamagishi (1988) also used a
public good dilemma to investigate the impact of exit
costs on stay/leave decisions in three-person groups. In
addition to differences in exiting between US and Jap-1 Formally, adding an exit-option departs from the definition of a
public good dilemma (Dawes, 1980). However, in this research we are
less interested in the game-theoretical properties of dilemmas than in
the ecological validity of social dilemma research. Similarly, in the past
researchers have added an option to vote for a leader (Messick et al.,
1983), introduce a sanctioning system Yamagishi (1986) as well as
exclude members from the group (Kerr, 1999) to the experimental
paradigm.anese participants, Yamagishi found that when exit
costs were low, high group investors were particularly
likely to leave a group (in about 40% of the trials).
Autocratic leadership and group stability
In addition to helping groups complete their tasks
and satisfy their members needs, a third generic func-
tion of leadership is to maintain a group as a viable on-
going system (Bass, 1990; Cartwright & Zander, 1953;
Hackman, 1990; Levine & Moreland, 1998; Yukl, 1989).
This is indirectly achieved by executing the first two
functions, task completion and need fulfillment, suc-
cessfully. But maintaining group stability can be the
primary objective of leadership in open groups, espe-
cially if there are attractive exit options, such as rival
groups, available (Levine, Moreland, & Ryan, 1998).
To maintain the viability of a group, a leader must
ensure that its members are sufficiently committed to stay
in the group. Here again the style of leadership can be
important. Open, democratic leaders, who actively in-
volve groupmembers in the decision-making processmay
be more likely to retain members than closed, autocratic
leaders. There may be distributive as well as procedural
reasons for this. From a distributive perspective, mem-
bers may be less committed to groups with an autocratic
leader, because such a leader gives them little opportunity
to free-ride on the efforts of others—recall that free-riding
is the dominant behavioral option in public good dilem-
mas (Komorita & Parks, 1994). From a procedural
perspective, members may not want to belong to auto-
cratically led groups, because they want more input into
group decision making (Tyler & Smith, 1998).
To our knowledge, there is no direct evidence yet
about the impact of leadership style on group stability in
social dilemmas. Several lines of research, however,
suggest that leadership style may indeed be important.
First, in one of the most famous leadership studies,
Lewin et al. (1939; White & Lippit, 1953) observed
groups of schoolboys that were led by adult teachers
who adopted either an autocratic, democratic, or laissez-
faire leadership style. Autocratically led groups were
slightly more productive than democratically led groups
in completing various group tasks, and both were
more productive than groups supervised by laissez-faire
leaders. But compared to the democratic and laissez-
faire groups, there was more discontent, hostility,
and aggression among children in the autocratically
led groups. Interestingly—and this is a lesser known
finding—all of the children in the democratic and laissez-
faire groups completed the study, but some of the
children in the autocratic groups dropped out before
completing all their tasks (Lewin et al., 1939).
Second, social psychological theory and research on
organizations hints at a relationship between organi-
zational stability and the dominant management style
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have found a negative correlation between job turn-
over, which can be regarded as exit behavior, and
opportunities for workers to influence management
when they experience work-related problems (Farrell,
1983; Ley, 1966; Rusbult & Lowery, 1985). These re-
sults are also consistent with research on the exit-voice
effect (Brockner, Tyler, & Cooper-Schneider, 1992;
Folger, 1977; Hirschman, 1970). If voice opportunities
are limited, then workers are less likely to remain in an
organization.
These two lines of research provide some evidence for
the destabilizing effect of autocratic leadership. How-
ever, researchers have not explicitly addressed the im-
plications of different leadership styles for the possible
collapse of groups. In our research, we thus investigated
the impact of leadership style on groups that always
need a certain number of people to function. Our main
prediction is that people are more likely to exit a group,
taking their resources elsewhere, when they are led by
someone with an autocratic rather than a democratic or
laissez-faire style of leadership.Experiment 1: Leadership style and group stability
In our first experiment, we compared the effects of
autocratic, democratic, and laissez-faire leadership on
small groups facing a step-level public good dilemma
(Van de Kragt, Orbell, & Dawes, 1983). For reasons of
experimental control, we used computer-mediated
groups rather than face-to-face groups—a common
procedure in social dilemma research (see, for example,
Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999; Yamagishi, 1988). There
were three investment task trials, after which individuals
were asked whether they wanted to stay in the same
group or join a different group for a subsequent task.
This was our primary dependent variable.
To examine the effects of leadership style, we manip-
ulated the content of the messages sent by the leader to
group members to simulate either an autocratic, demo-
cratic, or laissez-faire style (for a similar procedure, see
Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999; Experiment 2). We hy-
pothesized that exit behavior would be more prevalent in
the autocratic leadership condition than in the demo-
cratic (consultative) or laissez-faire leadership conditions.
Method
Design and participants
Eighty-seven psychology undergraduate students (11
men and 76 women) from an English University par-
ticipated to fulfill their course requirements. Their ages
ranged from 18 to 40 years, with an average of 21.5
years. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of
three experimental conditions (leadership style: auto-cratic vs. democratic vs. laissez-faire). There were be-
tween 28 and 30 participants per condition.
Procedure
Six participants were scheduled for each session.
When they arrived at the laboratory, they were sepa-
rated and seated in individual cubicles, each containing
a chair, table, and computer. All instructions were pre-
sented via the computer. These instructions were stan-
dardized for each participant depending upon his or her
experimental condition. There were 15 sessions alto-
gether, but in three of them, only five participants
showed up. From our viewpoint, this did not matter as
long as everyone believed that they were part of a six-
person group. So, after the participants in these 5-per-
son sessions were seated, they were led to believe that a
sixth person had been delayed, but had just arrived (for
a similar procedure, see Van Vugt & De Cremer, 2002).
During the debriefing, none of the participants in these
groups expressed any suspicion about this information.
Public goods task. Once they were seated, participants
received detailed instructions concerning the nature of
the task, which was described as a ‘‘group investment
task’’ that resembled a variety of investment problems in
everyday life. As an example, we used public television
in the UK, a classic public goods dilemma (Komorita &
Parks, 1994). Public TV can only be provided if a suf-
ficient number of people purchase a TV-license. But,
once it is provided, people can watch TV whether or not
they have purchased such a license. Hence, it is attrac-
tive not to purchase a TV-license, but if too many do so,
the good may not be provided at all.
Next, participants then received information about
the rules of the task and the possible outcomes for
themselves and the other group members. They were
told that there would be two similar tasks, each con-
sisting of up to five trials (to avoid ‘‘endplay’’ effects, we
did not specify the exact number of trials per task). Each
group member received £3 for each trial (approximately
$5), an amount that they could either keep or invest in a
collective good for the group (a monetary bonus). On
each trial, a minimum of four out of six group members
(two-thirds of the group) had to invest their endowment
to achieve the bonus (an extra £5 per group member). If
four people or more invested their endowments, then the
bonus was provided to everyone, regardless of whether
they made a contribution. However, if fewer than four
people invested their endowments, then the bonus was
not provided and those who invested lost their endow-
ments. Participants were told that due to budgetary
constraints, the money they earned during the experi-
ment would not be paid out directly, but rather con-
verted into lottery tickets for a raffle with attractive
monetary prizes (up to £25) that would be held after the
experiment was completed. To increase their chances of
winning a prize, it was thus wise for them to win as
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see Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999).
To ensure participants understanding of the task, we
administered a short quiz with questions regarding each
of the four different outcome scenarios (e.g., ‘‘How
much money do you earn when you invest your £3 and
so do at least three others in your group?’’ ‘‘. . . when
you keep your £3, but al least four others in the group
invest their £3?’’). The correct answers were provided as
feedback on the screen, which were displayed each time
the participant gave a wrong answer. Each question was
repeated until the participant answered it correctly.
Manipulation of leadership style. Participants were
told next that a leader would be assigned to the group
during the investment task. To justify this, we explained
that we were interested in studying the role of leaders in
helping groups to solve investment problems. We told
participants that a postgraduate student had been re-
cruited to act as their leader. This person would monitor
via the computer their groups performance to ensure
that their group would do well.
The leader presented himself to participants via a
standard email message. In the autocratic leader condi-
tion, he said:
Hi. I will be your group leader during the tasks. In order to en-
sure that you win the group bonus, I will automatically remove
the start-up money from four of you. I will not consult anyone
about my decision, so you will not have a say in whether you
make an investment or not. Each time I will simply remove
the start-up money from four members I choose to make sure
your group gets the bonus. After each task the computer will
let you know which group members have contributed.
In the democratic leader condition, the group leader
said:
Hi. I will be your group leader during the tasks. In order to en-
sure that you win the group bonus please let me know whether
you are willing to contribute or not. I will then remove contri-
butions from four of those who have volunteered. If not enough
people volunteer, however, I will have to remove the start-up
money from someone who has not volunteered, just to make
sure four people invest their money. After each task, the com-
puter will let you know which group members have contributed.
Finally, in the laissez-faire condition, the group lea-
der said:
Hi. I will be your group leader during the tasks. For each task
let me know whether you are willing to contribute, and I will
remove the start-up money from those of you who have volun-
teered. Hopefully, at least four people will make a contribution
in each task.
Investment task and feedback. After receiving a sum-
mary of the instructions, the first investment task began.
It consisted of three trials. Group outcome feedback was
standardized across the autocratic and democratic
leadership conditions. After each trial, the leader re-
ported that four members had made an investment, so
the group had won the bonus for that particular trial.The leader also identified those who made an invest-
ment, whereby the participant was named in two out of
three trials. This is in line with the a priori investment
probability that two-third of group members were nee-
ded to provide the good in each trial.
After the third trial, there was suddenly a computer
message from the experimenter. Participants were told
that the first task was completed, and that the second
task would start soon. They could either stay in the same
group or join a different group that was working si-
multaneously on the same two tasks in a different part of
the building. They were told that staying would mean
working under the same leader again, whereas leaving
would mean working in a group with no leader.
It was made explicit that leaving would harm a
groups chances of winning the bonus during the trials of
the second task, because a minimum of four investors
per group was still needed to win.
Dependent measure
Stay/exit choice. The stay/exit measure consisted of a
single choice ‘‘For the second task do you want to stay
in the same group or join the other group? (1¼ same
group, 2¼ other group).’’
Debriefing
After answering this question, the experiment was, in
fact, terminated. Participants were led to a room where
they received a thorough debriefing, including the true
purpose of the research and the content of the manip-
ulations. We also checked their knowledge about the
experiment. None of the participants was suspicious
about the authenticity of the messages they received
from the leader, nor could anyone guess what our main
hypothesis was. Finally, we explained that because
peoples earnings were affected by the experimental
condition they were in, every participant would have an
equal chance of winning the raffle. Winners of two £25
prizes would be randomly picked from a list of all par-
ticipants after the entire experiment was over. This lot-
tery was later held and the prizes were paid.
Results and discussion
We used parametric as well as non-parametric tests to
analyze the data from this experiment and the second
experiment. In addition to significance tests, we also
report the effect sizes; small, medium, or large effect sizes
correspond, respectively, to g2’s ¼ :01, .06, and .15
(Cohen, 1977).
Manipulation check
To examine the success of the manipulation of lead-
ership style, we asked several questions at the end of the
experiment. First, we checked whether participants re-
called the leadership information correctly: ‘‘What was
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(1¼ the leader decided which one of us contributed
without consulting us, 2¼ the leader consulted us about
whether we wished to contribute, and 3¼we could de-
cide for ourselves whether we wanted to contribute’’).
All participants correctly recalled this information.
We also asked participants to rate their agreement
(1¼ strongly disagree, 5¼ strongly agree) with state-
ments describing the dominance of the leaders style:
‘‘During the task the leader mademe feel redundant’’ and
‘‘I felt my freedom was being threatened by the leader.’’
Because these ratings were highly correlated, they were
averaged to form a single scale (a ¼ 0:72). There was an
overall effect of leadership style on the scale score,
F ð2; 84Þ ¼ 9:40; p < :001 ðg2 ¼ :18Þ. Post hoc compari-
sons using Tukeys HSD method revealed that members
of autocratically led groups found the leader more
dominant ðM ¼ 3:83; SD ¼ 1:59Þ than did members of
democratically led ðM ¼ 3:37; SD ¼ 1:51; p < :01Þ, and
laissez-faire led groups ðM ¼ 2:28; SD ¼ 1:08; p <
:001Þ. Also, the democratic leader was rated as more
dominant than the laissez-faire leader ðp < :01Þ. Fur-
thermore, the means in the autocratic, tð29Þ < 1, and
democratic conditions, tð27Þ ¼ 1:34, ns, did not differ
significantly from the scale midpoint (3), whereas the
mean in the laissez-faire condition did, tð28Þ ¼ 5:71;
p < :01.
Because these differences were in the expected direc-
tion, our manipulation of leadership style seemed to be
successful.
Stay/exit choice
The percentages of participants making a stay/exit
choice across the three-leadership conditions were
compared in a crosstabs analysis.
The exit percentage across the entire sample was
17.2%. There were no gender differences in stay/exit
choices, v2ð1; N ¼ 87Þ < 1 ðg2 ¼ :001Þ.
A subsequent analysis across the three conditions
showed a statistically significant association between
exit and leadership style, v2ð2; N ¼ 87Þ ¼ 12:64; p <
:001 ðg2 ¼ :14Þ.2 Our main hypothesis was that exiting
would occur more often in the autocratic leadership
condition than in the other two leadership conditions.
To test this hypothesis, we performed three planned
comparisons, one contrasting the autocratic condition
with the democratic and laissez-faire conditions com-
bined, one contrasting the autocratic and democratic2 The individual rather than the group was the unit of analysis in
these experiments. This seemed justified because there was no real
interaction among the six participants in each group session. Never-
theless, we checked (see Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998) for possible
non-independence effects by including group ðn ¼ 15Þ as a factor in the
analysis. There was no effect for this factor, v2ð14; N ¼ 87Þ ¼ 13:65;
p ¼ :48 ðg2 ¼ :02Þ.conditions, and one contrasting the democratic and
laissez-faire conditions. In support of our hypothesis,
the first contrast was significant—a much greater per-
centage of members chose the exit option in the auto-
cratic condition (36.7%; 11 out of 30 members) than in
the other conditions combined (7%; 4 out of 57 mem-
bers), v2ð1Þ ¼ 11:59; p < :001 ðg2 ¼ :14Þ. The contrast
between the autocratic (36.7%) and democratic condi-
tions (11%; 3 out of 28 members) was also significant,
v2ð1Þ ¼ 5:33; p < :03 ðg2 ¼ :09Þ. Finally, there was no
significant difference between the democratic (11%) and
laissez-faire conditions (3.4%; 1 out of 29 members),
v2ð1; n <¼ 57Þ < 1 ðg2 ¼ :02Þ.
The observed levels of exiting, if translated into real
group decisions, would have had implications for the
autocratically led groups only. On average, these groups
would have lost more than one-third of their members
(36.7%), a little more than two members on average per
group of six. Because each group required at least four
members (all contributors) to reach the step-level of the
good, a considerable number of autocratically led
groups thus would have failed to win the bonus on the
second task.Experiment 2: Why does leadership style affect group
stability?
Experiment 1 was the first demonstration of an effect
of leadership style on group stability. We wanted to
replicate this finding in a second experiment and inves-
tigate possible explanations for the destabilizing effect of
autocratic leadership. We used a similar paradigm as in
Experiment 1, but with two modifications. First, the
number of trials per investment task was extended from
3 to 8 to give participants more opportunities to interact
with and form impressions of the group leader. The
second modification concerned the exit option. In Ex-
periment 2, participants knew from the start that there
was another group working elsewhere in the laboratory.
We believed that this information would help partici-
pants to make a stay/exit decision later on in the ex-
periment. Hence, before the first investment task began,
we told the six members of each group that we would
randomly form two groups of three members each. To
maintain comparability between the two experiments,
the size of the good and the provision point were exactly
the same as before (a £5 bonus per member if two-third
of the group members invested).
Individuals were (ostensibly) randomly assigned to
one of the two smaller groups at the beginning of the
experiment. One of those groups had a leader assigned
to it. In fact, participants were always ‘‘assigned’’ to the
group with the leader. As in Experiment 1, individuals
were given an opportunity to switch groups at the end of
the first investment task.
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for a viable explanation for the effect of leadership style
on group stability. We thought that the influence of an
autocratic leadership style could be due to either the
distributive (outcome) or the procedural aspects of such
leadership. According to distributive theories of lead-
ership (Bass, 1990; Hollander, 1985; Thibaut & Kelley,
1959), leaders are primarily evaluated in terms of the
favorability and fairness of outcomes that they produce
for group members. In public good dilemmas, the best
possible individual outcome is free-riding (Komorita &
Parks, 1994), but an autocratic leader could well pre-
vent people from receiving that outcome, unlike a
democratic or laissez-faire leader, who would give
people some decisional freedom. From a distributive
viewpoint, group members should thus be more keen
to leave an autocratically led group, because they
would receive (or expect to receive) unfavorable per-
sonal outcomes. We will refer to this as the distributive
hypothesis.
Alternatively, there may be procedural reasons why
group members want to exit an autocratically led group
(Thibaut & Walker, 1975; Tyler & Smith, 1998). Under
autocratic leadership, group members have neither di-
rect (decision) control nor indirect (process) control over
the decision-making process. Autocratic leaders do not
allow members to have input into their decisions, nor do
they consult them before they make a decision. Con-
versely, democratic leaders provide members with con-
siderable process control (consultative leaders) and
some decision control (participative leaders). Finally,
laissez-faire leaders provide members with a lot of both
decision and process control. Researchers have consis-
tently shown the importance of procedural issues in the
endorsement of leadership (for a recent overview, see
Tyler & Smith, 1998). Some studies have shown that
the quality of procedures can be more important than
the quality of outcomes in that endorsement (e.g., Tyler,
2000). This leads to an alternative prediction regarding
autocratic leadership as a destabilizing force in public
goods: Group members may exit groups with automatic
leaders out of frustration with the procedural aspects of
that leadership style. We will refer to this as the proce-
dural hypothesis.
It is also possible that distributive and procedural
factors combine to produce the destabilizing influence of
autocratic leadership on groups during public good di-
lemmas. Perhaps group members are more keen to exit
an autocratically led group when they also receive un-
favorable personal outcomes. However, they may be
encouraged to stay when those outcomes are more
favorable. We shall refer to this as the interaction
hypothesis.
To explore these issues, we added an extra factor to
our paradigm. Participants were supervised by an au-
tocratic or democratic (consultative) leader, and theirendowment was used either very frequently (low out-
come favorability) or very rarely (high outcome favor-
ability) by the leader during the investment task. If the
distributive hypothesis is correct, then more people
should exit their group in the low than in the high
outcome favorability condition, and this effect should be
independent of leadership style. In contrast, if the pro-
cedural hypothesis is correct, then more people should
exit their group under autocratic leadership than under
democratic leadership, and this effect should be inde-
pendent of outcome favorability. Finally, the interaction
hypothesis suggests that outcome favorability should
have a greater influence on stay/exit decisions under an
autocratic leader (with unfavorable procedures) than
under a democratic leader (with favorable procedures).
To further explore these issues, we also asked group
members after the experiment about their reasons for
staying or exiting.
In Experiment 2, the laissez-faire leadership style was
used as a control condition, because it was impossible to
manipulate outcome favorability in this condition (ev-
eryone is free to decide whether they want to invest or
not when the group has a laissez-faire leader). Further-
more, we introduced a design improvement in Experi-
ment 2. To enhance comparability among the leadership
conditions, we gave the same bogus outcome feedback
in the laissez-faire condition as in the democratic and
autocratic conditions—on every trial, every group




One hundred and twenty six undergraduate students
(97 women and 29 men) from an English University
participated to fulfill their course requirements. Their
ages ranged from 18 to 45, with an average of 21.2 years.
Each participant was randomly assigned to one of four
experimental conditions, following a 2 (leadership style:
autocratic vs. democratic) by 2 (outcome favorability:
high vs. low) design. In addition, we added a fifth,
laissez-faire leadership style condition to the design.
Each of the conditions contained between 24 and 26
participants.
Procedure
Twenty-one group sessions were run. The procedures
were similar to those used in Experiment 1, with a few
exceptions. Before the first task, each participant was
assigned to one of two three-person groups, A or B, and
told that a leader would be assigned at random to one of
the groups. In reality, every participant was assigned to
group A, which always had the leader.
Next, participants were told that they would be per-
forming two investment tasks within their group, each
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consisted of eight trials. On each trial, all group mem-
bers received an endowment of £3. To win the bonus of
£5 per member, a minimum of two out of three group
members had to invest their endowments. As in Exper-
iment 1, participants were told that they would not ac-
tually receive the money they won. Instead, that money
would determine the number of lottery tickets they re-
ceived for a raffle (with various cash prizes), to be held at
the end of the experiment.
Manipulation of leadership style. The leadership style
manipulation was the same as the one employed before.
Participants had a leader who (a) invested the endow-
ments from two out of three group members, without
any form of consultation about who would make those
investments (autocratic condition), or (b) consulted with
members about who would make investments (demo-
cratic condition), or (c) left if up to members to decide
whether they wished to invest or not (laissez-faire con-
dition). The same messages that we used in Experiment
1 were used again.
Manipulation of outcome favorability. Across all three
leadership conditions, group outcome feedback was
standardized—the group always won the bonus. In the
autocratic and democratic conditions, however, indi-
vidual outcome feedback was manipulated. This new
factor was crossed with the two leadership conditions.
In the low outcome favorability condition, each partic-
ipants endowment of £3 was used in six out of eight
trials by the leader, which exceeds the probability of
being selected by chance. In contrast, in the high out-
come favorability condition, each participants endow-
ment was used in just two out of eight trials, which is
well below the probability of being selected by chance.
Thus, participants were individually much better off
(four times £3 equals £12) in the high outcome favor-
ability condition (expected payoff: £34) than in the low
outcome favorability condition (expected payoff: £22).
In neither of these conditions did the leader justify his or
her selection of endowments. We felt that any justifica-
tion might influence stay/exit decisions in an unpre-
dictable way. For example, if the leader said that the
selection of endowments was due to chance or to effort,
then some people might not have believed the feedback
(Bies & Shapiro, 1988).
After the first task was completed, participants re-
ceived an email message from the experimenter. They
were told that they could either stay in group A or join
group B for the second task, which both groups would
be performing at the same time. Staying would mean
working under the same leader, whereas leaving would
mean working in a leaderless group. As in Experiment 1,
we made the consequences of exiting a group clear. By
leaving, participants would harm a groups chances of
winning the bonus, because a minimum of two con-
tributors per group was still needed to win.Dependent measures
Stay/exit choice. The stay/exit measure consisted of a
single choice: ‘‘For the forthcoming task do you want to
stay in this group or move to the other group (1¼ stay,
2¼move)?’’
Reasons for staying vs. exiting. After they made this
choice, we asked participants to rate their agreement
(1¼ strongly disagree, 7¼ strongly agree) with eight
reasons for why they chose to stay or exit the group.
Four statements addressed satisfaction with the distrib-
utive aspects of the leadership styles: ‘‘I chose this option
because I was satisfied with the outcomes I received
from the leader,’’ ‘‘I considered the outcomes I received
to be fair,’’ ‘‘The leader harmed my personal interests,’’
(reversely coded), and ‘‘This leader helped me to in-
crease my income.’’ Another four statements addressed
satisfaction with the procedural aspects of the leadership
styles (adapted from Tyler & Lind, 1992): ‘‘I was able to
influence the decisions of the leader,’’ ‘‘This leader acted
in a procedurally fair way,’’ ‘‘The leader treated us with
respect,’’ and ‘‘The leader was honest and trustworthy.’’
Debriefing
The debriefing procedure was the same as in Exper-
iment 1. Again, we found no evidence that participants
were suspicious about the authenticity of the email
messages they received from the leader, and no one
could guess our research hypothesis. The same lottery
procedures used in the first experiment were again de-
scribed to participants and later used.
Results and discussion
Manipulation checks
Leadership style. To examine the success of the ma-
nipulation of leadership style, we again asked partici-
pants: ‘‘What was the procedure for making investments
in the previous task?’’ (1¼ the leader decided which one
of us contributed without consulting us, 2¼ the leader
consulted us about whether we wished to contribute,
and 3¼we could decide). All 126 participants recalled
this information correctly.
As before, we also asked participants to rate their
opinion (1¼ not at all and 7¼ extremely so) about
statements describing the leadership style: ‘‘To what
extent did the group leader make you feel redundant?’’
‘‘To what extent did the leader decide what should be
done and how it should be done?’’ ‘‘To what extent did
the leader allowed group members complete freedom in
their decisions’’ (reversely coded), and ‘‘To what extent
did you find the leader was bossy or dominating.’’
These scores were averaged to create a single domi-
nance scale (a ¼ 0:80), and subjected to a one-way
ANOVA involving the three leadership conditions
(collapsing across the two outcome favorability condi-
tions). This test was significant, F ð2; 123Þ ¼ 90:01;
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keys HSD method revealed that the autocratic leader
ðM ¼ 5:86; SD ¼ 0:98Þ was indeed considered to be
more dominant than either the democratic ðM ¼
4:04; SD ¼ 1:06; p < :001Þ or the laissez-faire leader
ðM ¼ 2:75; SD ¼ 0:95; p < :001Þ. The democratic and
laissez-faire leaders also differed significantly from each
other ðp < :001Þ. Finally, as expected, the autocratic,
tð49Þ ¼ 13:35; p < :001, and laissez-fair leaders ratings,
tð24Þ ¼6:60; p < :001, differed significantly from the
midpoint of the judgment scale (4), whereas the demo-
cratic leaders ratings did not, tð50Þ < 1.
Finally, we conducted a 2 (leadership style: autocratic
vs. democratic) by 2 (outcome favorability: high vs. low)
ANOVA to see if leader ratings were influenced by the
favorability of outcomes. This analysis revealed a signif-
icant main effect for Leadership Style, F ð1; 97Þ ¼ 68:27;
p < :001 ðg2 ¼ :17Þ. But the Outcome Favorability main
effect and the Leadership Style Outcome Favorability
interaction were not significant (both F ’s < 1; both
g2’s ¼ :001). Thus, it appears that the leadership manip-
ulation was indeed successful.
Outcome favorability. We asked participants how
many times their endowments were used by the leader.
In the high and low outcome favorability conditions, all
participants recalled this information correctly (de-
pending upon the condition, the correct answer was in
either ‘‘two’’ or ‘‘six out of eight trials’’).
Stay/exit choice
The exit percentage across the sample was 25.4%. As
in Experiment 1, there were no gender differences in this
behavior.
The percentages of participants making a stay/exit
choice in each of the three leadership conditions (col-
lapsed across the two outcome favorability-conditions)
were compared in a crosstabs analysis, as in Experiment
1. This analysis showed a statistically significant asso-
ciation between leadership style and exit, v2ð2; N ¼
126Þ ¼ 9:61; p < :01 ðg2 ¼ :08Þ.3 Again, we conducted
three planned comparisons. The first comparison con-
trasted the autocratic condition with the other two
leadership conditions. As in Experiment 1, this contrast
was significant. A much greater percentage of members
chose the exit option (40%; 20 out of 50 members) in the
autocratic condition than in the other two conditions
combined (15.8%; 12 out of 76 members), v2ð1; N ¼
126Þ ¼ 9:33; p < :01 ðg2 ¼ :32Þ. The contrast between
the autocratic (40%) and democratic conditions (17.6%;
9 out of 51 members) was also significant,3 As in Experiment 1, we checked for possible non-independence by
including group ðn ¼ 21Þ as a factor in the analysis. Again, there was
no effect for this factor, v2ð20; N ¼ 126Þ ¼ 19:08; p ¼ :52 ðg2 ¼ :01Þ,
suggesting that there was no influence of the particular group session
that participants attended.v2ð1; N ¼ 101Þ ¼ 6:16; p < :02 ðg2 ¼ :06Þ. Finally,
there was no significant difference between the demo-
cratic and laissez-faire conditions (17.6% and 12%; 3 out
of 25 members), v2ð1; n ¼ 76Þ < 1 ðg2 ¼ :005Þ.
As in Experiment 1, the observed levels of exiting, if
extrapolated to real groups, would have had implica-
tions for groups with autocratic leaders only. On aver-
age, these groups would have lost more than one
member per group of three (40% exit). Many of these
groups thus would have failed to win the bonus on the
second task, because each group needed contributions
from at least two members to win.
Can the destablizing influence of autocratic leaders be
attributed to the distributive or the procedural aspects
of that leadership style (or maybe to a combination of
those factors)? A logistic regression analysis was used to
study the combined impact of leadership style (auto-
cratic vs. democratic) and outcome favorability (low vs.
high) on participants stay/exit choices. According to the
distributive hypothesis, we would expect only a main
effect of outcome favorability: Members are more likely
to exit when the outcomes associated with a group lea-
der are personally unfavorable, regardless of that lea-
ders style. In contrast, the procedural hypothesis would
predict a main effect of leadership style, independent of
outcome favorability. Finally, the interaction hypothesis
would predict an interaction between leadership style
and outcome favorability.
We found a marginally significant main effect for
Outcome Favorability, v2ð1Þ ¼ 3:37; p < :07 ðg2 ¼ :03Þ.
As expected, more people exited when outcomes were
unfavorable (36.5%) than when outcomes were favorable
(20.4%). There was also a significant main effect for
Leadership Style, v2ð1; n ¼ 101Þ ¼ 6:40; p < :015 ðg2 ¼
:06Þ. As noted earlier, more people exited in the autocratic
condition (40%) than in thedemocratic condition (17.6%).
Finally, the Leadership StyleOutcome Favorability
interaction was not significant, v2ð1Þ < 1 ðg2 ¼ :001Þ.
Thus, the effect of leadership style was not dependent
upon whether group members received favorable or un-
favorable personal outcomes from the group leader.
Reasons for staying versus exiting
We also investigated the reasons for group members
decisions to stay or leave by analyzing their ratings of
the eight reasons described earlier. These were subdi-
vided into two sets of four reasons each, namely dis-
tributive reasons and procedural reasons. We averaged
the responses to each set of four reasons to create two
separate scales, outcome satisfaction and procedural
satisfaction. Both the outcome and procedural satisfac-
tion scales were internally consistent (respective
a’s ¼ 0:81 and 0.77) and the interscale correlation was
modest ðr ¼ :31Þ, albeit significant ðp < :001Þ.
There were clear differences in outcome and proce-
dural satisfaction depending on whether group members
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23.08, both p’s < :001 ðg2’s ¼ :20 and :17Þ. Exiters were
less satisfied than stayers with the outcomes (M ’s ¼ 4:05
vs. 5.10, SD’s ¼ 1:10 and 1.02) and procedures (M ’s ¼
2:91 vs. 4.34, SD’s ¼ 1:44 and 1.46) associated with their
leaders.
Scores on the satisfaction scales were also analyzed in
separate 2 (leadership style: autocratic vs. democratic) by
2 (outcome favorability: high vs. low) ANOVAs. For
outcome satisfaction, we found only a significant main
effect for Outcome Favorability, F ð1; 97Þ ¼ 12:05; p <
:001 ðg2 ¼ :11Þ, but no Leadership Style main effect,
F ’sð1; 97Þ < 1 ðg2’s < :01Þ and no Leadership Style
Outcome Favorability interaction, F ’sð1; 97Þ < 1 ðg2’s <
:01Þ. Group members were more dissatisfied when their
outcomes were unfavorable ðM ¼ 4:56; SD ¼ 1:12Þ ra-
ther than favorable ðM ¼ 5:30; SD ¼ 0:99Þ, although in
both conditions, satisfaction was reasonably high (com-
pared to the scale midpoint; t’sð51; 48Þ ¼ 3:61 and 9.19,
both p’s < :01).
For procedural satisfaction, only the main effect of
Leadership Style was significant, F ð1; 97Þ ¼ 24:16; p <
:001 ðg2 ¼ :20Þ. Group members were more dissatisfied
with procedures in the autocratic leadership condition
ðM ¼ 3:01; SD ¼ 1:09Þ than in the democratic leader-
ship condition ðM ¼ 4:08; SD ¼ 1:17Þ. Only the first
mean differed significantly from the scale midpoint,
tð49Þ ¼ 6:42; p < :001. There was no main effect for
Outcome Favorability, F ð1; 97Þ < 1 ðg2 < :01Þ, and no
Leadership StyleOutcome Favorability interaction,
F ’sð1; 97Þ < 1 ðg2 < :01Þ.
Finally, we performed an analysis to see whether
procedural satisfaction would mediate the effects of
leadership style on stay/exit choices. This was a logistic
regression with leadership style and outcome favorability
as predictors and procedural satisfaction as the covariate.
This analysis revealed a significant effect of procedural
satisfaction on stay/exit decisions, v2ð1Þ ¼ 13:84; p <
:001, but the main effect of leadership style was no longer
significant, v2ð1Þ ¼ 0:70; p ¼ :42 (in the original analy-
sis: v2ð1Þ ¼ 6:40; p < :015), whereas the outcome fa-
vorability effect, v2ð1Þ ¼ 2:32, ns (in the original analysis:
v2ð1Þ ¼ 3:37; p < :07) and the interaction between
leadership style and outcome favorability, v2ð1Þ < 1, re-
mained virtually the same. These results are consistent
with the idea that procedural concerns underlie the effects
of leadership style, although they should be interpreted
with caution, given that the reasons were rated after the
stay/exit choices were made.General discussion
Autocratic leadership is regarded by many analysts as
the most efficient solution to group conflicts involving
the distribution of scarce resources or the provision ofpublic goods (see Hardin, 1968; Hobbes, 1651/1939;
Messick & Brewer, 1983; Olson, 1965; Yamagishi, 1986).
The aim of our research was to challenge this view by
studying the longer-term consequences of an autocratic
style of leadership. We hypothesized that autocratic
leaders would threaten group stability by provoking
members to exit the group, thus removing vital resources
from it.
Individuals worked together in small, computer-
mediated groups on a step-level public good task under
the supervision of either an autocratic, democratic, or
laissez-faire leader. In the autocratic and democratic
conditions, participants received bogus success feed-
back, whereas in the laissez-faire condition either bogus
success feedback (Experiment 2) or no outcome feed-
back (Experiment 1) was given. After engaging in an
investment task, each group member was given an op-
portunity to leave the group and join a different group
for a subsequent task.
Perhaps because their groups were successful, more
people choose to stay in their groups, rather than leave.
But in both experiments, just as we predicted, people in
the autocratic conditions were more likely to choose the
exit option than were people in the other leadership
conditions. In fact, the proportion of exiters in the au-
tocratic condition was so high that many groups would
have failed, because they lost the critical number of
group members needed to produce the good. These
findings show that autocratic leadership is not a viable
solution to the provision and maintenance of step-level
public goods, at least in groups with permeable
boundaries (Ziller, 1965).
Autocratic leadership: A threat to group stability
Why does leadership style affect group stability? In
Experiment 2, we tested a distributive versus procedural
explanation for the destabilizing influence of autocratic
leadership. We found that when group members re-
ceived favorable personal outcomes from their leader,
they were less likely to exit than when their outcomes
were unfavorable. Although this effect was only mar-
ginally significant, it shows that group stability is, at
least partly influenced by the capability of leaders to
provide favorable outcomes for group members.
That is not the whole story, however, because the
influence of leadership style on group members stay/exit
choices did not interact with the favorability of out-
comes, suggesting that other factors affected how
members responded to an autocratic leader. Analyses of
the reasons that members gave for their stay/exit choices
were consistent with a procedural explanation for the
destabilizing influence of autocratic leadership: Under
an autocratic leader, group members were unhappy
about the amount of control they could exercise over the
decision-making process.
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ature, which argues that the primary difference between
autocratic and democratic (consultative) leadership lies
in the amount of control that group members have over
the decision-making process (Bass, 1990; Yukl, 1989).
Researchers have found that process control is often
more important for the endorsement of leadership than
decision control, and that process control is valued even
when it does not influence decision control (Tyler, Ra-
sinski, & Spodick, 1985). The procedural explanation is
also consistent with theoretical work on the exit-voice
hypothesis (Hirschman, 1970), which suggests that there
is a trade-off in the use of exit and voice among dissat-
isfied group members. If opportunities to voice their
concerns are lacking, then group members will resort to
exit, and if exit opportunities are absent, then they will
resort to voice.
Our experiments revealed no systematic difference in
exit behaviors between the democratic and laissez-faire
leadership conditions. Group members had more deci-
sion control under a laissez-faire leader than under a
democratic leader, but this did not produce a different
exit rate. This suggests again that group members were
primarily focused on the procedural rather than the
distributive qualities of different leadership styles.
Two alternative motives may underlie the importance
of procedural concerns in reactions to different leader-
ship styles (Tyler & Smith, 1998), and these need to be
explored in future research. First, based on a notion of
extended self-interest, group members may prefer to stay
in a group with a democratic rather than autocratic
leader, because having some input into the decision-
making process may lead to better personal outcomes in
the long-run than having no input at all (Thibaut &
Walker, 1975). Second, the group-value model (Tyler &
Lind, 1992) should be considered. This model argues
that a leadership style communicates important rela-
tional information to the group. In contrast to an au-
tocratic style, a democratic style leader conveys to group
members that their input is appreciated, and that they
are respected members of their group. People may thus
believe that group membership is more worthwhile un-
der a democratic rather than an autocratic leader whe-
ther or not they receive favorable personal outcomes.
Future research should make an effort to learn which of
these two motives accounts for the destabilizing influ-
ence of autocratic leadership style, perhaps by manipu-
lating members identification with their group (Van
Vugt & De Cremer, 1999).
Strengths, limitations, and implications
Before closing we wish to note some limitations and a
strength of our research. An apparent limitation of our
research involves the bogus success feedback that par-
ticipants received about the provision of the good. In theautocratic and democratic conditions, as well as the
laissez-faire condition in Experiment 2, every group was
successful at providing the good. This may explain why
more group members chose to stay in their group than
exit. But, the fact that exiting occurred more frequently
under autocratic leaders, even when they were successful
at producing the good, illustrates the strong resistance
against this leadership style. An aversion to autocratic
leadership has also been found in other studies (Nielsen
& Miller, 1997; Peterson, 1997; Rutte & Wilke, 1985;
Samuelson, 1993; Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999). For
example, in a group decision making study, Nielsen and
Miller (1997) found that groups that began with a dic-
tatorial decision rule nearly always reverted to a dem-
ocratic rule, regardless of how well or poorly they were
performing. However, we should be careful in assuming
that the resistance against autocratic leadership is uni-
versal, because most research on leadership (including
ours) has been conducted with samples from Western
democratic societies (cf. Bass, 1990).
A second limitation involves our manipulation of
leadership style. Recall that the leader in our experi-
ments was somebody from outside the group who was
assigned to lead on an unclear basis, rather than being
elected by group members or appointed on the basis of
particular leadership skills. Leaders are presumably
more legitimate sources of influence under the latter
conditions (Van Vugt & De Cremer, 1999). Fewer
members might have exited the autocratically led groups
if their leaders had been elected or appointed on merit.
Furthermore, based upon the leadership literature
(Bass, 1990; Cartwright & Zander, 1953; Lewin et al.,
1939; Yukl, 1989), we chose to compare three different
leadership styles, two of which were fairly extreme (au-
tocratic and laissez-faire styles) and a third (a demo-
cratic style) that tended more towards the autocratic
than the laissez-faire style. In natural groups, leaders
may adopt a more flexible leadership style, sometimes
open and democratic and at other times more distant
and authoritarian. Further research should examine the
impact of having a leader with a hybrid leadership style
on exit behaviors, using both laboratory groups and
natural groups.
A final limitation concerns our operationalization of
group stability. We focused exclusively on the effects of
members exiting their groups. We did so because stay/
exit decisions have an immediate impact on group per-
formance in step-level tasks. However, it would also be
interesting to explore the role of leadership style in the
recruitment of newcomers to groups (cf. Orbell &
Dawes, 1993). It may be that autocratic leadership is a
‘‘double whammy’’ for groups, because autocratic
leaders are poor at both retaining members and at-
tracting new members to replace them. Groups led by
such persons may thus be very unstable, even more so
than we have shown here.
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stability within a social dilemma context. Social di-
lemma research has largely ignored membership dy-
namics by studying cooperation within closed groups
only (for exceptions, see Orbell et al., 1984; Yamagishi,
1988). Most natural groups, however, are open systems
involved in continuous exchanges with their environ-
ment. These groups must try to preserve some degree of
stability to survive (Arrow et al., 2000). Our research
indicates that the presence of an attractive rival group
can threaten the groups existence (cf. Levine et al.,
1998). The use of a step-level task, which requires a
minimum number of contributors, enabled us to dem-
onstrate this convincingly.
A final issue concerns some implications of our re-
search for public good dilemmas in the real world. In
light of our findings, we believe that an autocratic style
of leadership is not a viable long-term solution to social
dilemmas, at least in open group settings. An autocratic
leader in an open group may not be able to secure the
welfare of the group in the long run, because group
members will be tempted to leave the group. To ensure
that there are always enough members, such a leader
could decide to close the boundaries of the group, either
psychologically via threats and sanctions (Kerr, 1999),
or even physically (like the Berlin Wall). Yet these
practices may not be feasible or socially desirable among
groups operating within Western democratic traditions.
To preserve group stability, an autocratic leader may
thus be forced to give group members input into the
decision-making process, perhaps by adopting a demo-
cratic or laissez-faire leadership style.Acknowledgments
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